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Felix Frankfurter

It is a fair characterization of the lawyer’s responsibility in our society that he [or she] stands 'as a shield' ... in defense of right and to ward off wrong.  From a profession charged with such responsibilities there must be exacted those qualities of truth-speaking, of a high sense of honor, of granite discretion, of the strictest observance of fiduciary responsibility, that have, throughout the centuries, been compendiously described as ‘moral character.’  (As cited by California Supreme Court, Exhibit January 27, 2014, Pg. 30.)

Justice Felix Frankfurter served as Associate Justice of the United States Supreme Court from January 30, 1939 to August 28, 1962.  He wrote 247 opinions for the Court, 132 concurring opinions, and 251 dissents.


Lawsuits Associated With These Events

First Lawsuit

V&E Medical Imaging Services, Inc., v. Mark & Carol DeCoursey, Case No. 06-2-24906-2 SEA, (“the Windermere suit”).  The suit was filed by V&E Medical Imaging Services, Inc. on March 29, 2006, and served to us on April 1, 2006. 

These representatives handled the Windermere lawsuit from inception to conclusion.

  1. Carol & Mark DeCoursey, pro se, from April 1 to April 7, 2006.
  2. Mark Clauson, Esq., from April 7 to April 19, 2006.
  3. Carol & Mark DeCoursey, from April 18, 2006 to September 19, 2007.
  4. Lane Powell, PC, from September 19, 2007 to August 3, 2011.
  5. The Allied Law Group, from August 3, 2011 to Nov. 10, 2011.

Precursor of Second Lawsuit

  1. On August 3, 2011, DeCourseys terminated Lane Powell.
  2. On August 3, 2011, Lane Powell filed a lien against upcoming judgment.
  3. On September 22, 2011, Paul Fogarty, Esq, on DeCourseys’ behalf, sent a 19-page letter to Lane Powell outlining the issues and seeking compromise.
  4. On September 23, 2011, Paul Fogarty, Esq. sent Lane Powell a two page letter asking that it stop interfering with payout of final judgment of uncontested money to DeCourseys.
  5. On September 28, 2011, Lane Powell responded identifying only one issue of possible compromise.
  6. On October 5, 2011, without further communication, Lane Powell filed suit.

Second Lawsuit

  1. On October 5, 2011, Lane Powell, represented by McNaul, Ebel, Nawrot & Helgren, filed Lane Powell PC v. Mark DeCoursey and Carol DeCoursey, Case No. 112-34596-3 SEA, for breach of contract, quantum meruit, and foreclosure of lien.
  2. On October 5, 2011, Lane Powell also served a discovery request, demanding DeCourseys place into evidence all communication with Lane Powell on all subjects.
  3. On October 5, 2011, Lane Powell's lawsuit assigned to Judge Richard D. Eadie, husband of Windermere broker.
  4. On October 6, 2011, Lane Powell’s counsel announced to Paul Fogarty that Lane Powell “would pay $800,000 in fees in this suit to recover $300,000.”

Representation in Lane Powell v. DeCourseys lawsuit.

  1. DeCourseys represent themselves pro se in Superior Court.
  2. Allied Law Firm represented DeCourseys in interlocutory appeal before Division 1, COA.
  3. Carney Badley Spellman represents DeCourseys in Court of Appeals (after the 2012 Summary Judgment, on the matter of recusal of Judge Eadie.)  (No. 69837-1-I.)


A Gun To The Head of the Junior Attorney”

We have no criticism of the young lawyer (“Mr. Good”), newly hired at Lane Powell in 2007, who tried to help us in our Consumer Protection Act suit against Windermere Real Estate.  In fact, we hold Mr. Good in the highest regard.

This young man -- who was married with three young children -- surely did not know that the head of his litigation group, Grant Degginger, Mayor of Bellevue, had just months prior accepted a large contribution from the Washington Association of Realtors.  Mr. Degginger should have revealed his conflict of interest to the young man, and to us.  For further discussion, see Part I, Chapter 1 of this report.

When the young man acted independent of Mr. Degginger’s supervision, we saw him as competent, loyal, aggressive, and fully aligned with our litigation goals.  But under Mr. Degginger’s direct supervision, he surely had to follow directions or risk his career and the welfare of his wife and three young children.  The pressure on him must have been enormous.

We refer the reader to Chapter 4, “A Gun to the Head of the Junior Attorney,” from the book “The Moral Compass of the American Lawyer,” by Richard Zitrin and Carol M. Langford (Ballentine, 1999).  This chapter describes the pressures on a junior attorney to betray his duties to his client and his Bar Oath.

We also point out that a lawyer working under such pressures -- having his loyalty to his clients pitted against the welfare of his family -- is surely wont to make errors.  Should such errors have occurred, we hold Grant Degginger responsible.

In sum, we hold Grant Degginger directly responsible for our bad experiences.  Rule 5.1 of the Rules for Professional Conduct, states:

Rule 5.1
Responsibilities of Partners, Managers, or Supervisory Lawyers

(a) A partner in a law firm, and a lawyer who individually or together with other lawyers possesses comparable managerial authority in a law firm, shall make reasonable efforts to ensure that the firm has in effect measures giving reasonable assurance that all lawyers in the firm conform to the Rules of Professional Conduct.

(b) A lawyer having direct supervisory authority over another lawyer shall make reasonable efforts to ensure that the other lawyer conforms to the Rules of Professional Conduct.

(c) A lawyer shall be responsible for another lawyer's violation of the Rules of Professional Conduct if:

(1) the lawyer orders or, with knowledge of the specific conduct, ratifies the conduct involved; or

(2) the lawyer is a partner or has comparable managerial authority in the law firm in which the other lawyer practices, or has direct supervisory authority over the other lawyer, and knows of the conduct at a time when its consequences can be avoided or mitigated but fails to take reasonable remedial action

The young lawyer left Lane Powell’s employ in or about November, 2009.  Based on information we received from someone inside Lane Powell, we understand the circumstances of his departure were acrimonious and involved the handling of our case.  Details are not available because the young lawyer and Lane Powell signed a non-disparagement agreement.

In the following report, when we refer to “Lane Powell,” we of course refer to actions taken by Degginger in Lane Powell’s name, and to the firm.

Introduction: Our Support

Why, and For Whom, Was This Written? This analysis has been written to draw attention to, and suggest remedies for the prejudicial use of the court system.

It was originally written as a complaint for the Washington State Bar.  But we have become convinced that the Bar alone cannot totally remedy the anomalies we describe, and that legislative action is necessary.  Hence we have addressed this analysis not only to the Washington Bar, but to the Washington Legislature, the US Congress, the Executive Branch of government and reform-minded citizens participating in public forums.

The fact base is the same or interwoven for each of these audiences.  Thus we provide one narrative.

Of necessity, we must mention the names of the attorneys involved, and the name of the judge.  However, we make no personal criticisms of these individuals.  We simply take exception to their conduct as officers of the court.  The courts are part of our system of government.  It is both our right and our obligation as citizens to draw attention to this conduct to publicly condemn it, and to lobby for corrective legislation.

To the Washington State Bar:  Please regard this is web site as an administrative aid to the Bar Complaint we have filed against Grant Degginger (WSBA 15261); Ryan McBride (WSBA 33280); Lane Powell, PC; Robert Sulkin (WSBA 15425); Malaika Eaton (WSBA 32837); and McNaul, Ebel, Nawrot & Helgren, PLLC.

To the Washington Legislature and U.S. Congress: Please regard this as a request for corrective legislation.  Please do not regard this as a complaint to the Washington State Bar about the lawyers and law firms named.

To the Executive Branches:  Please take action appropriate to your offices.

To Public Policy Forums:  Please regard this as a plea for help to bring about corrective legislative action.

An Opportunity to Restore Faith

This analysis is lengthy and fully documented.  It comes at a time when the public's faith in our institutions has been severely shaken.  This analysis describes a betrayal of public trust and a manipulation of the court system in favor of vested interests, and against the interests of “We The People.”

The perpetrators are clearly not worried that their acts will meet with censure.  They apparently believe that their powerful positions will guarantee they can take law into their own hands.

Many government agencies and the lawyers who serve them are known to have betrayed the public trust.  The mortgage, banking, and financial industries are examples.  Indeed, many believe our justice system and the democratic process itself have been hijacked –- in large part by a closed guild of lawyers whose only purpose is to enrich each other and the elite whom they serve.

On October 4, 2010, the Brennan Center for Justice and Justice at Stake wrote to Washington's Supreme Court Chief Justice Barbara Madsen and reminded her:

More than ever, the public needs to be assured that special interests cannot buy favorable treatment from the courts.  (Authorities, Justice at Stake/Brennan Center for Justice.)

With this report comes the opportunity to change the public perception of attorneys, the Bar, and the judicial process for the better.

Our charges are serious.  As stated above, we intend to lobby before state and federal legislatures for changes in the law to ensure such conduct will not occur in the future.  We would very much appreciate the support of the Bar and those in the public forum.

... justice should not only be done, but should manifestly and undoubtedly be seen to be done.  (R v Sussex Justices, ex parte McCarthy.)

We believe that the conduct of which we complain was intentionally designed to undermine the integrity of the judicial process, and that as such, it constitutes fraud on the court.

Fraud on the court (other than fraud as to jurisdiction) is fraud which is directed to the judicial machinery itself and is not fraud between the parties or fraudulent documents, false statements or perjury ... It is thus fraud where the court or a member is corrupted or influenced or influence is attempted or where the judge has not performed his judicial function -- thus where the impartial functions of the court have been directly corrupted.  (Authorities, Bulloch v. United States.)

On our case, this fraud on the court was a wrong against the institutions set up to protect and safeguard the public.

Furthermore, tampering with the administration of justice in the manner indisputably shown here involves far more than an injury to a single litigant.  It is a wrong against the institutions set up to protect and safeguard the public, institutions in which fraud cannot complacently be tolerated consistently with the good order of society.  Surely it cannot be that preservation of the integrity of the judicial process must always wait upon the diligence of litigants.  The public welfare demands that the agencies of public justice be not so impotent that they must always be mute and helpless victims of deception and fraud.  (Authorities Hazel-Atlas Glass Co. v. Hartford-Empire Co..)

When lawyers lie in court they commit fraud on the court.

Since attorneys are officers of the court, their conduct, if dishonest, would constitute fraud on the court.  (Authorities H.K. Porter Co. Inc. v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., Pg. 1119.)

The Events That Prompted This Report

Lawsuits Involved.  On March 29, 2006, a lawsuit was filed against us, Mark and Carol DeCoursey, on matters that arose from the purchase/renovation of a home.  In defense, we filed Consumer Protection Act claims against Windermere Real Estate and others.  During the dispute we became public and vocal critics of Windermere and the corrupt Washington regulatory agencies that refused to censure Windermere for its predatory business practices, hosting these webpages: http://www.Windermere-Victims.com and http://www.RenovationTrap.com.  For approximately 18 months, we represented ourselves pro se.  Between September 19, 2007 and August 3, 2011 Lane Powell represented us.  On August 3, 2011, we terminated Lane Powell.  On October 5, 2011, Lane Powell filed suit against us.  (Exhibit October 5, 2011 (1).  The outcome of that suit will decide who will receive the monetary awards of the Windermere lawsuit -- Lane Powell, or Windermere's victims, Mark and Carol DeCoursey.

Among other things, we allege that, in the first lawsuit (the “Windermere lawsuit”), Lane Powell:

  • Agreed to represent us without disclosing conflict of interest.
  • Betrayed the fiduciary duty owed to us.
  • Acquired proprietary interest in our lawsuit.
  • Used the lawsuit as a cash cow to generate legal fees for the firm and the shareholders.
  • Wrested control of the case away from the clients and converted it to their own uses.
  • Coerced the clients into signing an agreement prospectively limiting the attorneys‘ liability for malpractice.
  • Engaged in billing fraud, and interest and fee gouging.
  • Refused to follow our directions during Supreme Court petition, effectively shielding government corruption and the thwarting of public law from the eyes of the Supreme Court.

Lane Powell then hired McNaul, Ebel Nawrot & Helgren and began the second lawsuit.  We allege that McNaul attorneys, Robert Sulkin and Malaika Eaton, on behalf of Lane Powell:

  • Filed suit against us to force payment of exorbitant fees. 
  • Used the judicial process to commit extortion.  Lane Powell’s attorneys threatened to force our confidential attorney communications into evidence if we did not succumb to their fee demands. 
  • Blocked our access to justice and right to due process.
  • Prevented us from securing legal representation.  Lane Powell’s attorneys threatened to spend $800,000 in legal fees to prevail, forcing us to represent ourselves pro se before a judge married to a Windermere broker.
  • Argued to keep a judge with an apparent conflict of interest (appearance of prejudice) who was assigned to hear the case. 
  • Knowingly lied in court about material and verifiable facts.
  • Misrepresented issues of law to the court.
  • Committed fraud on the court.

The judge, who is married to a Windermere broker:

  • Refused to recuse himself despite an appearance of a blatant conflict of interest.
  • Allowed Lane Powell’s attorneys to lie about documentary material evidence.
  • Incorporated those patent lies into his judicial rulings.
  • Awarded Lane Powell $770,986.32 in fees/costs/interest (“damages”).



We are heartened by the fact that many leading figures in law see the problems that we see and have taken the positions we have taken in this analysis.  Here are the issues:

The Problem of Ethics in Mega-Firms:
A Respondeat Superior Solution to Discipline

Many informed persons believe that big, powerful law firms (such as Lane Powell) act as if they were a law unto themselves.  Marc Galanter and Thomas Palay gently state:

In its American setting, the large law firm has had an ambivalent relationship to legal ethics and professional responsibility.  (Authorities, Galanter, opening page.)

Professor Galanter and Dr. Palay criticize the large firm for abandoning the professional calling and becoming a mere business.  They quote A. A. Berle in “Modern Legal Profession” thus:

[T]he complete commercialization of the American bar has stripped it of any social functions it might have performed for individuals without wealth.  (Authorities, Galanter, Pg. 191.)

Galanter and Palay go on to quote Linowitz and Mayer's “The Betrayed Profession: Lawyering at the End of the Twentieth Century,” thus:

Within the legal profession itself, many share this sense that law has freshly descended from a noble profession infused with civic virtue to commercialism.  (Authorities, Galanter, Pg. 192.)

When lawyers from big and politically influential firms commit offenses, those lawyers are unlikely to be disciplined.  Those views are reflected in a 2005 Harvard Law Review article, “Collective Sanctions and Large Law Firm Discipline”:

An underdeterrence problem exists in the regulation of unethical conduct of lawyers in large firms.  Between 1995 and 1998, the American Bar Section on Litigation engaged a task force of professional responsibility experts to study the many examples of 'talented partners at major establishment law firms in the nation's biggest cities' committing 'clear ethical violations.' The fact that such violations were addressed and proscribed in ethics rules was not enough to deter perpetrators.  One likely cause of this underdeterrence is that state bar disciplinary sanctions are almost never meted out against lawyers practicing in firms of any significant size.  Commentators have suggested that a cause of this lack of large-firm enforcement is that disciplinary sanctions apply only to individuals, and the team-based nature of large law firm work obscures the identity of an individual responsible for any particular instance of wrongdoing.  (Authorities, Harvard, Pg. 1. Footnotes omitted.)

A successful law firm can generate huge incomes for the shareholders.  When the incentive to lie, cheat, and steal is great and the disincentive is small or nonexistent, the result is foreseeable.

The authors of the 2005 Harvard Law Review article endorse the solution proposed some time ago by Professor Ted Schneyer: Make the firms, not just the lawyers, responsible under the doctrine of respondeat superior. Professor Ted Schneyer has proposed that the responsibility-masking problem could be alleviated by imposing fines on law firms as entities for disciplinary violations of their members under respondeat superior liability.  (Authorities, Harvard Pg. 1)

The article goes on to state:

... At one time, legal practice was characterized by the sole practitioner.  Over the years, the makeup of the profession has shifted.  With this shift, it has been suggested that the primary mode of legal discipline should also evolve to focus on firms as the culpable unit.  Specifically, given that the benefits of wrongdoing often flow from the firm (for example, salary, partnership draw, and the esteem of colleagues), the firm can properly be viewed as liable for allowing these incentive schemes to reward unethical behavior.  (Authorities, Harvard, Section V “Maintaining Fairness,” A.)

Professor Ted Schneyer’s contribution to the field of legal ethics is renowned.  In 1991, he wrote his groundbreaking article, “Professional Discipline for Law Firms?”  (Authorities, Schneyer.)  More than twenty years later, that work is regarded as a benchmark in the field of legal ethics.

Professor Susan Saab Fortney, who organized the April 5, 2013 Conference on the Ethical Infrastructure and Culture of Law Firms, held at Hofstra University, states this:

In 1991, Professor Ted Schneyer first used the term “ethical infrastructure” to refer to a law firm’s organization, policies, and operating procedures that cut across particular lawyers and tasks.  In questioning how lawyer regulation focuses on the conduct of individual lawyers, he described the dynamics of practice and how various ethical breaches stem from organizational concerns that relate to lawyering in groups.  In advocating that firms be subject to discipline, he explained the following:
Given the evidentiary problems of pinning professional misconduct on one or more members of a lawyering team, the reluctance to scapegoat some lawyers for sins potentially shared by others in their firm, and especially the importance of a law firm’s ethical infrastructure and the diffuse responsibility for creating and maintaining that infrastructure, a disciplinary regime that targets only individual lawyers in an era of large law firms is no longer sufficient.
(Authorities, Fortney, Footnotes omitted.

Large law firms have come under scrutiny by authors Marc Galanter and Thomas Palay, who write:

In the aftermath of the collapse of many savings and loan associations, regulators have pursued large law firms for being uncritically co-operative with the schemes of their financial clients.  From 1989 to 1993, regulators brought over ninety cases against law firms.  In a 1992 proceeding that shook the upper reaches of the profession, Kaye Scholer, a Wall Street firm, paid a forty-one million dollar settlement rather than face seizure of its assets that would have threatened its very existence.  The following year Jones Day Reavis & Pogue, the second largest United States firm, paid a record fifty-one million dollars to settle government claims that it helped conceal fraud by convicted financier Charles Keating.  (Authorities, Galanter, Pg. 196.  Footnotes omitted.)

We agree.  Respondeat superior must be applied to law firms.  When a client is represented by an attorney who works for a law firm, the law firm, not the attorney, is a party to the representation agreement.  And clients pay the firm, not the individual lawyer.  Factually, the law firms represent the clients and the lawyers are the firm’s agents.  But the firms are not licensed to practice law, are not members of the Bar, and are not subject to Bar discipline.  Permitting law firms to operate with licensing and discipline allows the firms to become as a breeding ground of dishonesty, greed, and expedience, contrary to the principles enunciated by the Bar.  Disciplining individual lawyers addresses only part of the problem.

[Sadly, law has become a for-profit business, rather than a profession practiced by such noble defenders of the common law such as Sir Edward Coke and Roger Williams, whose principled stances are so eloquently described in John Barry's “Roger Williams and the Creation of the American Soul.”]

James K. DeBuse writes about “the law industry” and the corporatization of law firms; he discusses the possibility that law firms may soon be publicly traded in the U.S., as they are in Australia.  (Authorities, DeBuse.)  It would seem that law firms want the advantages of “corporatization” but none of the disadvantages of respondeat superior?

Legislative Proposal.  Law firms be licensed to practice law.  They be disciplined when appropriate, the principle of respondeat superior should be applied when disciplining attorneys who work for firms.

Duty of Loyalty and Fiduciary Duty

“Duty of Loyalty -- A Sacred Treasure.”  Lawrence Fox, partner of Drinker, Biddle & Reath of Philadelphia, is a former chairman of the ABA Standing Committee on Ethics and Professional Responsibility and former chairman of the ABA's Section of Litigation.  Writing for the Yale Law Journal, he states:

Quite simply, lawyers’ duty of loyalty is the most fundamental of all fiduciary duties the legal profession owes to its clients.  From the beginning of the profession, lawyers have owed an unwavering duty of loyalty to their clients, a duty that is recognized in the common law of every jurisdiction of the United States and codified in every American code of legal ethics ever promulgated.
It is from this wellspring that the integrity of the attorney-client relationship emerges.  The duty of loyalty creates the trust that enables effective representation.  All other aspects of the attorney-client relationship, a relationship whose constitutional dimensions the Supreme Court has repeatedly recognized and defended, derive from and reinforce the lawyer’s primary duty of loyalty.  Yet once the loyalty wellspring is poisoned, every aspect of the relationship, and the representation itself, is suspect.
As a case in point, consider conflicts of interest.  Conflicts are different in degree and in kind from other failures of representation because they infect every aspect of the attorney-client relationship.  [Footnotes omitted.] (Authorities, Fox, Section II.)

Indeed, the sorry tale that resulted in this story started with the undisclosed conflict of interest of Lane Powell shareholder, Grant Degginger, former Mayor of Bellevue, Republican political hopeful, and chair of the firm's Construction and Environmental Litigation Group.  His group agreed to represent us against Windermere et al. without telling us that the Washington Association of Realtors was the largest single contributor to his election campaign. We believe that Mr. Degginger's undisclosed conflict of interest led him to breach of his fiduciary duty and contract obligations to us; that as a result of the conflict, he minimized our opponent’s exposure and our gain, while protecting a network of government corruption that is undermining consumer protection laws.

We charge that Degginger committed many other offenses against the Rules of Professional Conduct.  For details, see Part I, Chapter I through Chapter IV.

[Note: We endorse the words of retired Michigan Supreme Court Justice Elizabeth A. Weaver in her book (co-authored with David Schock) Judicial Deceit, in which she outlines Michigan’s justice problems:

We don’t want to leave the impression that this is just a problem because of so-called conservative Republicans.  While the so-called conservatives ... are the most recent offenders ... the so-called liberals, the Democrats, also had their less-perfected ‘go-at-it’ for many years before.  (Authorities, Weaver, Pg. 751.)

Criminal and Tortious Conversion

A person who knowingly or intentionally exerts unauthorized control over property of another person commits criminal conversion.
Unlike criminal conversion, the mens rea is not an element and good faith is not a defense in the case of tortious conversion.  Conversion, as a tort, consists “either in the appropriation of the personal property of another to the party’s own use and benefit, or in its destruction, or in exercising dominion over it, in exclusion and defiance of the rights of the owner or lawful possessor, or in withholding it from his possession, under a claim and title inconsistent with the owner’s[ii].”  (Authorities, U.S. Legal Inc.)

A legal claim is an asset like any other asset.  It can be bought or sold, assigned, or wrongfully converted into another’s use.  We argue the lawyers at Lane Powell wrongfully converted our claim against Windermere, to their own use and benefit.  The sophistication of the techniques of conversion should not be a barrier to prosecution.

Legislative Proposal.  Attorneys who exploit laws designed to protect the public interest should be charged with criminal conversion, required to disgorge all the fees and awards garnered by such abuse, and fined for a commensurate amount.

Extortive Use of Attorney-Client Privilege -- Under Color of Law

On October 5, 2011, the day Lane Powell filed its lawsuit, it served discovery requests for ALL communication between Lane Powell and us on ALL subjects, regardless of the relevance to Lane Powell's October 5 claims.  (Exhibit October 5, 2011 (1).)  We charge that those demands violated the civil rules, laws, and precedents protecting attorney-client privilege.  The message was clear: In order to avoid having ALL our confidences forced into evidence during litigation (such as Mark's hypothetical experience as a male stripper or Carol's hypothetical experience as a recovering kleptomaniac, see Part II), we must submit to Lane Powell's fee demands.

RCW 9A.56.110 states:

"Extortion" means knowingly to obtain or attempt to obtain by threat property or services of the owner ...

Notice that the crime of extortion includes the attempt to obtain, even if the attempt does not succeed.

RCW 9A.56.130 defines extortion in the second degree:

(1) A person is guilty of extortion in the second degree if he or she commits extortion by means of a wrongful threat as defined in *RCW 9A.04.110(25) (d) through (j).

RCW 9A.04.110 provides definitions:

(28) "Threat" means to communicate, directly or indirectly the intent:
(e) To expose a secret or publicize an asserted fact, whether true or false, tending to subject any person to hatred, contempt, or ridicule; or
(f) To reveal any information sought to be concealed by the person threatened;

Note, again, that Lane Powell requested in discovery ALL privileged material before we had filed any defenses or counterclaims – Lane Powell attorneys Sulkin and Eaton's requests were served on October 5, 2011, and our Answer was not served until 20 days later.

We find no specific Rule in the RPC that forbids lawyers from blackmailing/extorting their clients.  Nonetheless, we believe that existing general rules pertaining to attorney-client privilege and fair treatment provide grounds for our complaint.  And we expect the Bar to take disciplinary action.

Nothing in the Revised Code of Washington exempts a special class of persons (lawyers) from the laws against extortion.  When lawyers commit extortion, they should be disbarred and prosecuted to the fullest extent of the law, just as any other citizen would be.

We urge that the RPC be amended to specifically prohibit extortion, using the word “extortion” so there is no doubt what is being prohibited.

Of note: Lane Powell's extortive use of the attorney-client privilege was done at a time when attorney-client privilege has come under attack.  Kim J. Askew, Chair, American Bar Association Section on Litigation, states:

In sophisticated legal publications, mainstream newspapers, and magazines alike, the attorney-client privilege and work product doctrine are the topics of much recent discussion ... The profession has been given a wake-up call ... The privilege goes to the essence of our legal system and promotes equality under the law.  (Authorities, Askew, Pg. 1; emphasis added.)

When lawyers use attorney-client privilege to extort former clients, no one else will respect the privilege either.  Lane Powell’s attack on our attorney-client privilege is a threat to the attorney-client privilege of all Americans, everywhere.

Legislative Proposal: State and federal statutes on extortion should be amended to specifically include attorney extortion: Threatening exposure of client’s confidences to force payment of money, sexual favors, or anything else.

Denial of Access to Justice/Denial of Due Process

The 14th Amendment of the United States states:

... No state shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any state deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.

On October 6, 2011, the day after filing suit, Lane Powell's counsel threatened to spend “$800,000” in legal fees to recover “$300,000 (detailed in Part II, “Sulkin Uses Prohibited Strategy to Deny Us Representation”).

In the face of that threat of financial ruin, we could not hire a lawyer to represent us: we'd be annihilated by the legal fees our own attorney would charge to answer Lane Powell's onslaught.  We thus represented ourselves pro se.

Legislative Proposal:  The Revised Code of Washington and the United States Code should be amended to prohibit attorneys from using the cost of litigation to strip ordinary people of their access to the courts and their rights to justice under the 14th Amendment of the U.S. Constitution.  The litigation budget of the wealthy should be limited to some proportion of the target‘s annual income.  The monied interests should not be permitted to bludgeon the less wealthy into submission by their superior ability to pay legal bills.

Anomalous Assignment: Judge Is Husband of Windermere Broker

Lane Powell filed suit against us in the King County Courthouse while the Windermere lawsuit was still ongoing -- in the King County Courthouse. 

The stated policy of the King County Courthouse is to assign judges to lawsuits by a random computer program.  But Public Disclosure Commission (“PDC”) records show that of the 32 judges sitting on the Superior Court bench in October, 2011, only one -- Judge Richard D. Eadie -- was married to a Windermere broker/agent, and only Judge Eadie was a beneficiary of the Windermere Retirement Plan.  PDC records also show that Judge and Mrs. Eadie were the principals of a real estate trust fund.

The curious assignment of Ricard D. Eadie, which is studied in more detail in Part II, Chapter I (“When Judicial Assignments Don’t Pass the Smell Test: Judge Is Married to Windermere Broker”) and Richard D. Eadie’s conduct -- his refusal to recuse himself, his repeated refusal to strike Lane Powell’s many patently false and contradictory statements, his forwarding of those false statements in his sweeping rulings in Lane Powell’s favor, and his dismissal of our defenses without a hearing on the facts -- add to the perception that there was fraud on the court.

As attorneys McMorrow, Gardina, and Ricciardone, point out:

... judges are the primary regulators of litigation conduct.  While much of the litigation action occurs outside the courtroom, judges set the norms for that out-of-court litigation conduct through the signals that they send and the sanctions they impose for conduct that occurs during pretrial conferences, discovery motions, and other pre- and post-trial activity.  (Authorities, McMorrow, [*1425].)

Given this truth, we can understand why Lane Powell’s attorneys, Sulkin, Eaton, et al. felt so comfortable in conducting themselves as they did: they knew that Judge Eadie was on their side.

Legislative Proposal: We propose that the state of Washington require judges and magistrates to make full financial disclosure statements and conflicts lists, that the statements be updated regularly, and that the statements be posted on court’s “Judge’s Information” webpage.  The United States District Court for the Northern District of Iowa has such a program.  (Exhibit February 5, 2014 gives a sample: Conflicts list for Chief Judge Linda R. Reade.)  In such a fashion, every litigant in the State of Washington will have immediate information on an appearance of prejudice on the part of the judge.

The Fraternity of Judges and Lawyers

Judges Protect and Empower Lawyers.  It is a well-known secret that judges (almost always former lawyers) are sympathetic to the legal profession.  Dennis G. Jacobs is Chief Judge of the Federal Appeals Court, Second Circuit, New York.  In an August 27, 2007 article entitled “With the Bench Cozied Up to the Bar, the Lawyers Can't Lose,” The New York Times states:

Dennis G. Jacobs, judge of the federal appeals court in New York, is a candid man, and in a speech last year he admitted that he and his colleagues had “a serious and secret bias.” Perhaps unthinkingly but quite consistently, he said, judges can be counted on to rule in favor of anything that protects and empowers lawyers.  (Authorities, Liptak.)

The remarks which drew The New York Times‘ attention were published in “The Secret Life of Judges,” a Fordham Law Review article written by Judge Jacobs.

In our courts, judges are lawyers.  They are all lawyers.  Most of us have never been, nor want to be, anything else.  We are proud of being lawyers.  For many of us (like myself), lawyering is our only talent (assuming we have any talent at all), and it is the source of as much esteem as we enjoy.  Our calling says a lot about how our minds work, what we respect, and whom we trust.

I am not--I repeat, I am not-speaking about a bias based upon politics or agenda, economic class, ethnicity, or para-ethnicity.  When I refer to the secret life of judges,  I am speaking of an inner turn of mind that favors, empowers, and enables our profession and our brothers and sisters at the bar.  It is secret, because it is unobserved and therefore unrestrained--by the judges themselves or by the legal community that so closely surrounds and nurtures us.  It is an ambient bias.  (Authorities, Jacobs, Pg. 2856.)

In short, when judging a case between a lawyer and a non-lawyer, a judge tends to play favorites, seeing the lawyer as the home team.

The problem of judiciary bias in favor of lawyers has also been addressed by Professor Benjamin Barton of the University of Tennessee Law School.  In his recently published book “The Lawyer-Judge Bias in the American Legal System” (Cambridge University Press, December, 2010), Professor Barton states:

“... when given a chance, judges favor the interests of the legal profession over the public.” (Authorities, Barton (1), Pg. 2)

In an earlier article, “Do Judges Systematically Favor the Interests of the Legal Profession?” (October 2007, University of Tennessee Legal Studies Research Paper No. 1) Professor Barton wrote:

Here is my lawyer-judge hypothesis in a nutshell: many legal outcomes can be explained, and future cases predicted, by asking a very simple question: is there a plausible legal result in this case that will significantly affect the interests of the legal profession (positively or negatively).  If so, the case will be decided in the way that offers the best result for the legal profession.  (Authorities, Barton (2), Pg. 1.)
A brief study of judges -- who they are, how they are trained, what their jobs are like, and salary effects -- leads to the inevitable conclusion that judges will regularly favor the interests of lawyers over other litigants.  Many judges rely upon lawyers to get or keep their jobs.  Most state judges face some type of election (either contested or retention) and lawyers provide most of the elected judiciary’s campaign donations.  (Authorities, Barton (2), Pg. 4.  Footnotes omitted; emphasis added.)

We believe that Grant Degginger, his fellow shareholders at Lane Powell, and their counsel, Robert Sulkin and Malaika Eaton, were well aware of the “old boy” network that unifies lawyers and judges.  We believe that they threatened to spend “$800,000” in fees knowing we could not afford representation in such a match, would have to face Judge Eadie ourselves, and predicted the deleterious effects on us.  Grant Degginger, his colleagues at Lane Powell, and their counsel Sulkin and Eaton, were once again “engaging in conduct prejudicial to the administration of justice.”

Now we must deal with other problems, addressed below.

Fraud on the Court

We believe that the conduct of which we complain was intentionally designed to undermine the integrity of the judicial process, and that it constitutes fraud on the court by that definition.

Fraud on the court (other than fraud as to jurisdiction) is fraud which is directed to the judicial machinery itself and is not fraud between the parties or fraudulent documents, false statements or perjury ... It is thus fraud where the court or a member is corrupted or influenced or influence is attempted or where the judge has not performed his judicial function -- thus where the impartial functions of the court have been directly corrupted. (Authorities, Bulloch v. United States.)
In our case, this fraud on the court was a wrong against the institutions set up to protect and safeguard the public.
Furthermore, tampering with the administration of justice in the manner indisputably shown here involves far more than an injury to a single litigant.  It is a wrong against the institutions set up to protect and safeguard the public, institutions in which fraud cannot complacently be tolerated consistently with the good order of society ... The public welfare demands that the agencies of public justice be not so impotent that they must always be mute and helpless victims of deception and fraud.  (Authorities, Hazel-Atlas Glass Co. v. Hartford-Empire Co., Pg. 246.)


When lawyers lie in court, they commit fraud on the court.

Since attorneys are officers of the court, their conduct, if dishonest, would constitute fraud on the court.  (Authorities, H.K. Porter Co., Inc. v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., Pg. 1119.)

The Problem of Lawyers Who Lie to the Court

It is a truism: Without truth, there can be no justice. When officers of the court lie, they strike at the heart of justice. The lying lawyer destroys the fabric of our legal system and undermines the confidence of the public in our institutions.

Let us examine the larger problems and offer solutions.

Attorney Rules Require Truthfulness

The Rules of Professional Conduct prohibit lawyers from making false statements:
RPC 3.3
Candor Toward The Tribunal
(a) A lawyer shall not knowingly:

(1) make a false statement of fact or law to a tribunal or fail to correct a false statement of material fact or law previously made to the tribunal by the lawyer;


[2] This Rule sets forth the special duties of lawyers as officers of the court to avoid conduct that undermines the integrity of the adjudicative process ... the lawyer must not allow the tribunal to be misled by false statements of law or fact or evidence that the lawyer knows to be false. [4] Legal argument based on a knowingly false representation of law constitutes dishonesty toward the tribunal.

The Washington Bar Oath Prohibits Lawyers to Lie or Use False Arguments.  The Bar Oath (Para. 5) requires lawyers to swear that:
5. I will not counsel or maintain any suit or proceeding which shall appear to me to be unjust, or any defense except as I believe to be honestly debatable under the law, unless it is in defense of a person charged with a public offense.  I will employ, for the purpose of maintaining the causes confided to me, only those means consistent with truth and honor. I will never seek to mislead the judge or jury by any artifice or false statement.  (AuthoritiesWashington Bar Oath.)

Court’s Civil Rules Prohibits Lawyers to Lie or Use False Arguments.

CR 11

The signature of a party or of an attorney constitutes a certificate by the party or attorney that the party or attorney has read the pleading, motion, or legal memorandum, and that to the best of the party's or attorney's knowledge, information, and belief, formed after an inquiry reasonable under the circumstances:

(1) it is well grounded in fact;

(2) is warranted by existing law or a good faith argument for the extension, modification, or reversal of existing law or the establishment of new law;

(3) it is not interposed for any improper purpose, such as to harass or to cause unnecessary delay or needless increase in the cost of litigation; and

(4) the denials of factual contentions are warranted on the evidence or, if specifically so identified, are reasonably based on a lack of information or belief.

If a pleading, motion, or legal memorandum is not signed, it shall be stricken unless it is signed promptly after the omission is called to the attention of the pleader or movant.  If a pleading, motion, or legal memorandum is signed in violation of this rule, the court, upon motion or upon its own initiative, may impose upon the person who signed it, a represented party, or both, an appropriate sanction, which may include an order to pay to the other party or parties the amount of the reasonable expenses incurred because of the filing of the pleading, motion, or legal memorandum, including a reasonable attorney fee.  (Emphasis added.)

Yet in our case, RPC 3.3, the Bar Oath, and Civil Rule 11 apparently mean nothing to Lane Powell’s attorneys, Robert Sulkin and Makaika Eaton, nor apparently to their clients, Grant Degginger and his colleagues at Lane Powell.  The judge in our case not only refused to sanction Sulkin, Eaton and their client for CR 11 violations, he took up their false statements and made many the bases for many of his rulings. See Part II, Chapter 2, “The Truth, the Lie, and the Judge.”

Condemnation of Dishonest Lawyers:
Judge Speaks Out

Courts set the bar for acceptable conduct in society.  When attorneys lie in court and the judge accepts those lies, a clear message is sent: Lying is a winning strategy.  Lying thus infects the society.  When lying becomes acceptable in a society, that society cannot survive.  Lying undermines all society’s institutions.

From the Bench.  When Lawyers Lie.”  U.S. District Court Judge Elaine E. Bucklo (Northern District of Illinois) addresses the subject of lying lawyers in “From the Bench.” When Lawyers Lie” in the Winter 2007 edition of Litigation.  She sternly points out:

Lawyers and judges are the keepers of the integrity of the judicial process, which is fundamental to our democracy.  The importance of candor by lawyers, and the necessity to insist upon it, is well stated in United States v. Shaffer Equipment Co., 11 F3d. 450, 457 (4th Cir. 1993): 

Our adversary system for the resolution of disputes rests on the unshakable foundations that truth is the object of the system’s process which is designed for the purpose of dispensing justice … Even the slightest accommodation of deceit or a lack of candor in any material respect quickly erodes the validity of the process.

Contrary to popular fiction, I think most lawyers are very honest, perhaps more honest than the average citizen.  But we as judges need to take seriously the times when a lawyer is not.  (AuthoritiesBucklo, Pg. 6. “From the Bench.  When Lawyers Lie,” Litigation, Winter, 2007, Volume 33 Number 2.)

Lawyers Speak Truth About Lying Lawyers

Many lawyers are willing to speak truthfully about the practice of lying by lawyers. One such lawyer is Richard Zitrin, co-author with Carol M. Langford of the 1999 classic “The Moral Compass of the American Lawyer.” (Authorities, Zitrin.)  See especially Part III, “Greed and Deceit, or ‘Everybody’s Doing It’” which contains Chapter 8, “Lawyers as Liars.”

During his discussion, Mr. Zitrin cites the work of Iowa law professor Gerald B. Wetlaufer who has made a study of the different types of lies lawyers use when negotiating -- but has apparently not yet classified the types of lies told by lawyers to the court. (Authorities, Wetlaufer.)

Judge: Bar Protects Dishonest Lawyers

There is a perception that the Bar protects -- rather than disciplines -- dishonest lawyers.  This perception is shared by members of the public and some judges.  The authors of a 2004 Hofstra Law Review put it this way:

There is a lurking sense that futility plays a role for some judges.  A judge on the Florida Court of Appeals recently expressed his frustration with amazing candor:

While in light of [the lawyer's] egregious conduct, we feel duty bound by Canon 3D(2), Code of Judicial Conduct hereby to report him to the Florida Bar, we have no illusions that this will have any practical effect.  Our skepticism is caused by the fact that, of the many occasions in which members of this court reluctantly and usually only after agonizing over what we thought was the seriousness of doing so -- have found it appropriate to make such a referral about a lawyer's conduct in litigation ... none has resulted in the public imposition of any discipline -- not even a reprimand -- whatever ... Speaking for himself alone, the present writer has grown tired of felling trees in the [*1436] empty ethical forest which seems so much a part of the professional landscape in this area. Perhaps the time has come to apply instead the rule of conservation of judicial resources which teaches that a court should not require a useless act, even of itself.

(Authorities, McMorrow et al., Pg. 4, 1435, 1436.)

The desire to protect members of one’s own profession understandable, but to fail to discipline members whose conduct offends public decency can only undermine reputation of the profession.  And the crooks win.

Perhaps the most stinging indictment of attorneys’ propensity to protect attorneys who clearly needed discipline is documented in the infamous Fisons case.  A description of that case, “Sleazy in Seattle,” is included in this analysis.  (Authorities, Taylor.)

The Growing Rumble: STOP LYING

The New York Times Lauds Judge Alex Kozinski.  Kozinksi is Chief Judge of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit.  The Times quotes him:

“There is an epidemic of Brady violations abroad in this land. Only judges can put a stop to it.”

The Times observed:

Brady violations are, by their nature, hard to detect, but Judge Kozinski had no trouble coming up with more than two dozen examples from federal and state courts just in the last few years.

Fighting prosecutorial misconduct is not only about protecting the innocent.  It is, as Judge Kozinski wrote, about preserving “the public’s trust in our justice system,” and the foundation of the rule of law.  (Exhibit January 4, 2014.)

Former Judge Stripped of Law License.  Judge Ken Anderson has been stripped of his license to practice law, removed from his seat on the Bench, and sentenced to ten days in jail in Williamson County, Texas.  Anderson was a former prosecutor who withheld exculpatory evidence (“Brady material”) in a murder trial in 1987; the wrongful conviction caused Michael Morton to spend 25 years in prison.  (The Dallas Morning News, January 29, 2014.)

Calls for James Clapper to Be Prosecuted and Fired for Lying to Congress.  The author of the Patriot Act, Jim Sensenbrenner, has demanded that James Clapper be prosecuted for lying to Congress and denying that the NSA was spying on the American people.  (The Huffington Post, December 6, 2013.)

Tangled Webs. How False Statements Are Undermining America.”  In this book, Harvard Law School graduate and Pulitzer Prize winning journalist James B. Stewart tells his readers:

Although lying seems to be an inherent part of human nature, the narrow but serious class of lies that undermines the judicial process on which government depends has been a crime as old as civilization itself.  Originally prosecuted in England by ecclesiastical courts, by the sixteenth century perjury was firmly embedded as a crime in the English common law.  The offender was typically punished by cutting out his tongue, or making him stand with both ears nailed to the pillory.  False testimony that resulted in the execution of an innocent person was itself punishable by death.  Exile, imprisonment, fines, and "perpetual infamy" were meted out as the centuries passed.

Perjury was a crime in the American colonies and has been a crime in the United States since independence.  Today perjury and false statements are federal offenses under U.S. criminal code Title 18, and perjury is also outlawed by statute in all fifty states.  (Authorities, Stewart.)

But the acceptance of turpitude is spreading from the courts to the society at large:

Philadelphia Principals Fired in Cheating Scandal.”  On January 22, 2014, The New York Times reported that three Philadelphia public school principals were fired for cheating.

The 140 educators were accused of violating test protocols, either by providing students with answers, erasing wrong answers or supervising those who did without reporting improprieties, the district said.  (Exhibit January 22, 2014 (2).)

Nuclear Corps, Sidelined in Terror Fight, Produces a Culture of Cheating.”  On February 4, 2014, The New York Times reported that missile-launching Air Force officers routinely cheated on exams, and on January 22, 2014 reported that the Navy had begun an investigation of cheating on tests during training on nuclear reactors.

US air force documents reveal ‘rot’ in culture of nuclear weapons officers.”  That story was reported by The Guardian on March 13, 2014.  (Exhibit March 13, 2014.)

Ex-sheriff’s deputies charged with planting evidence at pot dispensary.”

Two former Los Angeles County sheriff’s deputies have been charged with conspiracy, perjury and altering evidence in connection with planting guns inside a medical marijuana dispensary to justify two arrests in 2011, prosecutors said ... Both men were booked Friday and released on $50,000 bail each.  They are scheduled to be arraigned June 17.  Prosecutors said if the former deputies are convicted of the charges, they face more than seven years in state prison.  (Exhibit, April 23, 2014.)

5 cops caught in lies on witness stand, judge says.”  Five Chicago-area police officers offered identical testimony in a drug case -- and then a police video contradicted the testimony of all five.  The judge is quoted:

Obviously, this is very outrageous conduct ... All officers lied on the stand today. ... All their testimony was a lie.  So there’s strong evidence it was conspiracy to lie in this case, for everyone to come up with the same lie. ... Many, many, many, many times they all lied.  (Exhibit April 15, 2014.)

Lying Lawyers Not Welcome in California:
The Glass Decision

On January 27, 2014, The Washington Post wrote:

Stephen Randall Glass made himself infamous as a dishonest journalist by fabricating material for more than 40 articles for The New Republic magazine and other publications.  He also carefully fabricated supporting materials to delude The New Republic’s fact checkers.  The articles appeared between June 1996 and May 1998, and included falsehoods that reflected negatively on individuals, political groups, and ethnic minorities.  During the same period, starting in September 1997, he was also an evening law student at Georgetown University’s law school.  Glass made every effort to avoid detection once suspicions were aroused, lobbied strenuously to keep his job at The New Republic, and, in the aftermath of his exposure, did not fully cooperate with the publications to identify his fabrications.  (Exhibit January 27, 2014 (2).)

On January 27, 2014, in its decision on Stephen Glass’s application to the Bar, the California Supreme Court wrote:

To be qualified to practice law in this state, a person must be of good moral character.  (Bus. & Prof. Code, §§ 6060, subd. (b), 6062, subd. (a)(2).)  Good moral character includes “qualities of honesty, fairness, candor, trustworthiness, observance of fiduciary responsibility, respect for and obedience to the law, and respect for the rights of others and the judicial process.”  (Rules of State Bar, tit. 4, Admissions and Educational Stds., rule 4.40(B); see also Bus. & Prof. Code, § 6068.) “Persons of good character ... do not commit acts or crimes involving moral turpitude — a concept that embraces a wide range of deceitful and depraved behavior.”  (In re Gossage (2000) 23 Cal.4th 1080, 1095 (Gossage).)  A lawyer’s good moral character is essential for the protection of clients and for the proper functioning of the judicial system itself.  (See In re Johnson (1992) 1 Cal.4th 689, 705-706 (conc. & dis. opn. of Kennard, J.).) (Authorities, Glass, Pg. 23.)
The Court continued:
Honesty is absolutely fundamental in the practice of law; without it, “‘“‘the profession is worse than valueless in the place it holds in the administration of justice.’”’” (Menna, supra, 11 Cal.4th at p. 989.) “[M]anifest dishonesty ... provide[s] a reasonable basis for the conclusion that the applicant or attorney cannot be relied upon to fulfill the moral obligations incumbent upon members of the legal profession.”  (Hallinan, supra, 65 Cal.2d at p. 471.)  As the dissent in the Review Department pointed out, “if Glass were to fabricate evidence in legal matters as readily and effectively as he falsified material for magazine articles, the harm to the public and profession would be immeasurable.”  (Authorities, Glass, Pg. 30.)

The Court then referred to its duty to “protect the public and maintain the integrity and high standards of the profession.”

Glass and the witnesses who supported his application stress his talent in the law and his commitment to the profession, and they argue that he has already paid a high enough price for his misdeeds to warrant admission to the bar.  They emphasize his personal redemption, but we must recall that what is at stake is not compassion for Glass, who wishes to advance from being a supervised law clerk to enjoying a license to engage in the practice of law on an independent basis.  Given our duty to protect the public and maintain the integrity and high standards of the profession, our focus is on the applicant’s moral fitness to practice law.  On this record, the applicant failed to carry his heavy burden of establishing his rehabilitation and current fitness.  (Authorities, Glass, Pg. 32-33.)

In its coverage of the Glass decision, CNN wrote:

The court found that Glass, who works as a paralegal at a Beverly Hills law firm, lacks “the good moral character” to be a lawyer.  It simply doesn’t buy the disgraced serial liar’s arguments that he has changed.

Lawyer jokes to the contrary, the court insisted, “A lawyer’s good moral character is essential for the protection of clients and for the proper functioning of the judicial system itself.” (Exhibit January 27, 2014 (3), CNN. “Court: Serial liar Glass can’t be lawyer.” Emphasis added.)

The California Supreme Court Justices quoted the words of Justice Felix Frankfurter:

“It is a fair characterization of the lawyer’s responsibility in our society that he [or she] stands ‘as a shield’ ... in defense of right and to ward off wrong.  From a profession charged with such responsibilities there must be exacted those qualities of truth-speaking, of a high sense of honor, of granite discretion, of the strictest observance of fiduciary responsibility, that have, throughout the centuries, been compendiously described as ‘moral character.’” (Authorities, Glass, Pg. 30.)

Arizona State Bar Acknowledges That Lawyers Lie in Court
and Condemns the Practice

The Arizona Bar does not beat around the bush.  It is not afraid of the “L” word.  It admits, upfront, in a circular addressed to the public, that sometimes lawyers lie.

Arizona consumers deserve the highest quality legal representation. To achieve that goal, all lawyers in our state must follow the Rules of Professional Conduct.

The primary purpose of the disciplinary process is to protect the public. Lawyers engaged in serious misconduct, such as lying to the court, theft of client funds or certain crimes, may be suspended or disbarred. (Authorities, Arizona Bar, emphasis added.)

California Appeals Court Blasts Lawyer Lying

These words were written by Judge William W. Bedsworth of the Court of Appeals of California, Fourth District, Division 3, in Kim v. Westmoore Partners, Inc.

It is critical to both the bench and the bar that we be able to rely on the honesty of counsel.  The term "officer of the court," with all the assumptions of honor and integrity that append to it, must not be allowed to lose its significance ... The corrosive effect of little lies differs from the corrosive effect of big lies only in the time it takes for the damage to become irreversible.  (201 Cal.App.4th 292, 293.)

“How much do you sanction an attorney who lies to the court, seeks unwarranted sanctions, bullies opposing counsel, shows no remorse, and effectively vows to continue such tactics by endorsing his conduct when challenged on it?" does not seem to have been a question yet addressed by other courts. (201 Cal.App.4th 294)  (Authorities, Kim v. Westmoore Partners, Inc.)

Federal Court in Illinois Blasts Lawyer Lying

The headlines in the Madison St.-Clair Record read:

Federal judge orders three Prenda Law attorneys to pay more than $260K in fees; Says they have show ‘relentless willingness to lie to the Court.’ (Exhibit, December 5, 2013.)

The article in the Madison-St. Clair Record tells the story of lawyer lying to the court about having received service of process.

Lawyer Lying in Court Now Criminal Offense in New York

New York’s courts are acting on New York’s Judiciary Law Section 487, which makes lying in court a criminal offense -- with potential for jail time for the lawyer.  At least two recent decisions have been handed down as a result of Section 487.

Amalfitano v. Rosenberg.  The case addressed the misconduct of attorney Armand Rosenberg.  Among other things, Rosenberg was found to have misrepresented a number of material facts during a lawsuit he handled for a client.  New York’s prosecution of Rosenberg was examined by the United States Court of Appeals, Second Circuit, on July 15, 2008.  That court requested that New York clarify some aspects of the law, and that was done on February 12, 2009.  Those two decisions, an American Bar Association discussion and the New York Attorney Malpractice Blog discussion can be found at Authorities, Amalfitano v. Rosenberg.

Melcher v. Greenberg Traurig, LLP.  This case was decided on April 1, 2014.  The author of the Melcher decision, Judge Susan Phillips Read of the New York Court of Appeals, held that enforcement of Judiciary Law Section 487 is not dependent on a showing that the court was fooled by the attorney’s fraud.  Judge Read held that Section 487 derives from the First Statute of Westminster, which was adopted by the Parliament summoned by King Edward I of England in 1275.

Melcher v. Greenberg Traurig also established that the statute of limitations on Judiciary Law Section 487 is six (6) years.  See the decision and discussion at Authorities, Melcher v. Greenberg Traurig, LLP.

South Dakota Legislature Provides Treble Damages and Disbarment

Law of the State of South Dakota:

16-19-34.    Deceit and collusion as grounds for disbarment--Treble damages.An attorney and counselor who is guilty of deceit or collusion, or consents thereto, with intent to deceive a court or judge, or party to an action or proceeding, is liable to be disbarred, and shall forfeit to the injured party treble damages to be recovered in a civil action.  (Authorities, North Dakota.)

Michigan Legislature: Fines and Imprisonment for Lying Lawyers

Law of the State of Michigan:

Michigan Judicature Pg. 31, Sec. 64. Any attorney, or counselor who shall be guilty of any deceit or collusion, or shall consent to any deceit or collusion, with intent to deceive the court or any party, shall be deemed guilty of a misdemeanor, and on conviction shall be punished by fine not exceeding one thousand dollars or imprisonment in the county jail not exceeding six months, or both, in the discretion of the court, and shall also be liable to the party injured by such deceit or collusion in treble damages sustained, to be recovered in a civil action.  [Re-enactment 1946, 1957, 1971, 1997.]

DECEIT OR COLLUSION: Attorneys, solicitors and counselors are sworn officer of the court, appointed to aid the courts in which they are employed in the administration of impartial justice, and not only the character with which they are thus invested, but the positive laws of the state, require that they shall not be guilty of any deceit or collusion, with intent to deceive the court, or any party, and the stature makes the violation of this duty a misdemeanor, punishable by fine and imprisonment, and subjects the guilty to a civil action and treble damages for the injury.  Backus v. Byroni, 4 Mich. 552.  (Authorities, Michigan.)

Oklahoma: Lying Lawyers Disbarred and Pay Treble Damages

Law of the State of Oklahoma:

Chapter 7, Sec. 578. For what disbarred. Any attorney and counselor who is guilty of deceit or collusion, or consents thereto, with intent to deceive a court of judge or party to an action or proceedings, is liable to be disbarred and shall forfeit to the injured party treble damages, to be recovered in a civil action. (Authorities, Oklahoma.)

Why Are Washington Lawyers So Bold About Lying to the Court?

The lawyers of whom we complain seem to be arrogantly confident that no harm will befall them when they lie to the court.  See Part II, Chapter 2 for graphic representation.  We wonder how Truth and Justice became so trivially perceived in Washington?

The Bars of both New York and California were concerned enough about lying lawyers to deny Glass membership.  But the situation in Washington is more critical.  Attorneys who lie to the court are already members of the Bar.  They have violated their Bar Oaths, violated CR 11, violated RPC 3.3.  And their lies are incorporated in judicial findings.  They should also be subject to the criminal perjury statutes.

These experienced attorneys evidently believe they can do as they please with the truth in the Washington court system.  Apparently they believe that a culture of lying prevails and they will not be held accountable.

Are they correct in that belief?

Q: Why Don’t Judges Routinely Sanction Lying Lawyers?
A: Many Judges Rely Upon Lawyers for Their Jobs

Washington perjury laws are not applied to attorneys who make false statements in their written or oral statements to the court: strictly speaking, the attorneys do not make their statements to the court “under oath,” as witnesses do, after being sworn in.  Put another way: RCW 9A.72 does not specifically state that attorneys are subject to perjury laws when making false statements in their pleadings, motions, legal memoranda, or oral arguments in court.  So lawyers who lie in court dodge the perjury laws.

But why don’t judges routinely sanction lawyers who lie to them?

Given an idiosyncrasy in our political system, judges are dependent upon contributions to their re-election campaigns -- and may be careful of stepping on the corns of influential lawyers.  As Profession Barton pointed out, (above): Many judges rely upon lawyers to get or keep their jobs.  Attorneys for our former law firm, Lane Powell, repeatedly made material and patently false statements to the court; the judge allowed them to do so, and often forwarded their proven lies in his rulings.  See Part II, Chapter 2 for a graphic presentation.

Attorney Deceit Statutes: Promoting Professionalism Through
Criminal Prosecutions and Treble Damages

Lawyers -- whether they practice in the State of Washington or other states -- should be required to conform to ethical standards suited to officers of the court.  Professor Alex B. Long’s 2010 article, “Attorney Deceit Statutes: Promoting Professionalism Through Criminal Prosecutions and Treble Damages,” has been abstracted, below, by the UC Davis Law Review:

Unbeknownst to many lawyers, numerous jurisdictions - including New York and California - have statutes on the books that single out lawyers who engage in deceit or collusion.  In nearly all of these jurisdictions, a lawyer found to have engaged in deceit or collusion faces criminal penalties and/or civil liability in the form of treble damages. Until recently, these attorney deceit statutes have languished in obscurity and, through a series of restrictive readings of the statutory language, have been rendered somewhat irrelevant. However, in 2009, the New York Court of Appeals breathed new life into New York’s attorney deceit statute through its decision in Amalfitano v. Rosenberg ... (Authorities, Long (1).)

The Honesty in Lawyering Act

The American Legislative Exchange Council (“ALEC”) has proposed the “Honesty in Lawyering Act.”  The stated purposes of the Act are:

(1) To establish needed and greater protection for average consumers of legal services against unlawful or deceitful practices of attorneys; and

(2) To provide transparency requirements and more checks and balances to expose, curb, and rectify attorney misconduct that violates the public interest.  (Authorities, ALEC.)

ALEC’s proposal deserves careful consideration.

Private Securities Law Requires Truth in Court

Washington State could enact legislation to clean up the courts in all cases, perhaps modeled after 15 U.S.C. (2011), §78u–4 [Private securities litigation], which provides:

(c) Sanctions for abusive litigation,

(1) Mandatory review by court: In any private action arising under this chapter, upon final adjudication of the action, the court shall include in the record specific findings regarding compliance by each party and each attorney representing any party with each requirement of Rule 11(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure as to any complaint, responsive pleading, or dispositive motion.

(2) Mandatory sanctions: If the court makes a finding under paragraph (1) that a party or attorney violated any requirement of Rule 11(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure as to any complaint, responsive pleading, or dispositive motion, the court shall impose sanctions on such party or attorney in accordance with Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Prior to making a finding that any party or attorney has violated Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, the court shall give such party or attorney notice and an opportunity to respond.

(3) Presumption in favor of attorneys’ fees and costs (A) In general, Subject to subparagraphs (B) and (C), for purposes of paragraph (2), the court shall adopt a presumption that the appropriate sanction— (i) for failure of any responsive pleading or dispositive motion to comply with any requirement of Rule 11(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure is an award to the opposing party of the reasonable attorneys’ fees and other expenses incurred as a direct result of the violation; and (ii) for substantial failure of any complaint to comply with any requirement of Rule 11(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure is an award to the opposing party of the reasonable attorneys’ fees and other expenses incurred in the action.

The federal regulation of lawyers, including the application of federal consumer protection law to lawyers, has been the subject of scholarly discussion. (Authorities, Green, Pg. 366.)

We Are Our Brother’s Keepers:
Stamp Out the Culture of Lying

After reviewing the testimony Glass received from his supporters, the Supreme Court of California concluded with these words:

They [Glass’s witnesses] emphasize his personal redemption, but we must recall what is at stake is not compassion for Glass, who wishes to advance from being a supervised law clerk to enjoying a license to engage in the practice of law on an independent basis.  Given our duty to protect the public and maintain the integrity and high standards of the profession our focus is on the applicant’s moral fitness to practice law.
(Authorities, Glass, Pg. 33; emphasis added.)

The Washington Bar and other State Bars across the country should do whatever they can to stamp out the culture of lying.  In Judge Kozinski’s words, above, what is at stake is “the public’s trust in our justice system.”

Close the Perjury Loophole

Legislative Proposals.  Attorneys should be held accountable for lying to the court -- even if the judge lets them lie.  The perjury loophole should be closed by the legislature.  We suggest the law be amended to require that every statement to the court include the language found in RCW 9A.72 and be subject to the penalties and provisions of that chapter.

The federal laws prohibiting perjury (18 USC Section 1621) should be similarly amended. Lawyers who knowingly lie about material issues in their averments to the court should be prosecuted.  The State and Federal Courts should require:

  1. Each written pleading an attorney files in court must end with these words:
The undersigned certifies under penalty of perjury under the laws of [jurisdiction] that (1) this pleading is well grounded in fact; (2) this pleading is warranted by existing law or a good faith argument for the extension, modification, or reversal of existing law or the establishment of new law; (3) this pleading is not interposed for any improper purpose, such as to harass or to cause unnecessary delay or needless increase in the cost of litigation; and (4) the denials of factual contentions are warranted on the evidence or, if specifically so identified, are reasonably based on a lack of information or belief.
  1. Each attorney is put under oath, to the effect of the words above, before making any statements in court; the oath is held binding for the duration of the matter, throughout all further hearings and continuances.
  2. For every motion for CR 11 sanctions, the court must produce a written finding of fact, either granting or denying the motion, with regard to the matters therein.  If granted, the court may increase, reduce or seek further information concerning the sanctions.  The motion itself may be found to be a violation of CR 11, and is subject to this same law.
  3. Judges must act on a party's demonstration to the court that the other party is lying.  A judge who permits a party to lie in court and ignores patent demonstration of the lie or lies gives prima facie evidence of judicial prejudice; no further evidence of judicial prejudice is required to overturn all of the judge's rulings, orders and judgment in the case.
  4. Judges who permit one party to tell patent lies to the court -- without sanctioning the dishonest party -- must disgorge one year’s income to the general tax coffers.
  5. When it is shown that one party has told a provable and material lie about the facts of the case or intentionally misrepresented the law, and that party has not immediately withdrawn and corrected the false statement or statements, the act shall be regarded as fraud on the court and the case of the party at fault shall be summarily dismissed.

Import New York Judiciary Law 487

Legislative Proposal.  The legal foundation of New York’s Judiciary Law 487 rests the First Statute of Westminster, passed during the reign of King Edward I in 1275.  See discussion above.  New York’s Judiciary Law 487 should be passed by state legislatures around the country, and by Congress.  It is an important part of our tradition -- and allowing lawyers to lie in court is not an improvement.

Citizens Should Be Granted Prosecutorial Powers

Legislative Proposal.  The legal right of citizens to file grievances against attorneys who knowingly make false statements about material facts in their averments should be established. Citizens should be granted “citizen attorney general” powers, modeled after the federal qui tam law.

Citizen prosecution of lawyers who lie to the court should not be contingent upon showing proof of personal damages.  Lawyers who lie in court have damaged the social fabric and have committed a crime against society.  Lawyers who lie to the court should be subject to prosecution from anyone who witnesses the conduct.

Frivolous prosecutions would be discouraged because the citizen prosecutors in such actions must also sign their complaint under penalty of perjury, as outlined above.

We now turn our attention to another matter:

Billing Fraud and Fee Gouging

Recent news coverage of fee gouging by the world’s largest legal firm, D.L.A. Piper, emphasized the problem if dishonesty in billing practices.  (Exhibit March 25, 2013.)

According to an article in the Georgetown Journal of Legal Ethics, Winter, 1998:

One of the greatest challenges to the legal profession today is overcoming the stigma that attorneys are untrustworthy.  One of the reasons for this prevalent notion is the widespread practices of unethical hourly billing.  (Authorities, Watson, Pg. 1.)

The LexisNexis summary of Lee A. Watson’s article states:

ABA Formal Opinion 93-379 recognized that padding and double billing are pervasive forces in the legal world ....

Lee Watson cites the case of a North Carolina attorney once convicted of billing ninety (90) hours in a single day ...  (Authorities, Watson, Pg. 1.)

And in his article entitled “For a Few Dollars More: The Perplexing Problem of Unethical Billing Practices by Lawyers,” Douglas R. Richmond, senior vice-president of Global Professions Practice, states:

“... the once forbidden subject of unethical billing practices by lawyers is now openly discussed.  Reported cases in which lawyers are professionally disciplined or criminally prosecuted for billing abuses are disturbingly routine.  Press account of lawyers’ alleged billing and expense fraud are similarly common.” (Authorities, Richmond, Pg. 64.)

Mr. Richmond cited 36 contemporary disciplinary cases:

  1. United States v. Dougherty, 200 F.3d 819 (11th Cir. 1999) (unpublished table decision) (affirming lawyer’s wire fraud conviction for fraudulent billing);Statewide Grievance Comm. v. McGee, No. CV-02-0099371-S, 2003 WL 22333085, at *3-*8 (Conn. Super. Ct. Oct. 2, 2003) (disbarring lawyer for fraudulent billing, among other violations);
  2. In re Romansky, 938 A.2d 733, 735-36 (D.C. 2007) (suspending lawyer for negligently adding time to clients’ bills to collect premium for desirable results);
  3. Fla. Bar v. Dougherty, 769 So. 2d 1027, 1027-28 (Fla. 2000) (per curiam) (disbarring lawyer who was convicted for wire fraud for overbilling a client);
  4. In re Beckner, 778 N.E.2d 806, 811 (Ind. 2002) (per curiam) (disbarring lawyer for fraudulent billing);
  5. Iowa Sup. Ct. Bd. of Prof’l Ethics & Conduct v. Tofflemire, 689 N.W.2d 83, 95 (Iowa 2004) (suspending lawyer for billing fraud);
  6. In re Miller, 147 P.3d 150, 156-57 (Kan. 2006) (per curiam) (suspending lawyer who fleeced the state workers’ compensation fund through unreasonable billings);
  7. In re Myers, 127 P.3d 325, 328-29 (Kan. 2006) (per curiam) (censuring lawyer who billed in one hour minimum increments, even when doing less than an hour’s work);
  8. In re Kellogg, 50 P.3d 57, 66 (Kan. 2002) (per curiam) (suspending lawyer for fraudulent billing);
  9. Att’y Grievance Comm’n v. Kreamer, 946 A.2d 500, 533-34 (Md. 2008) (finding that charging a client for overhead expenses was an ethical violation);
  10. In re Goldstone, 839 N.E.2d 825, 837 (Mass. 2005) (disbarring lawyer for falsely billing fees and expenses);
  11. In re Charges of Unprof’l Conduct in Panel Case No. 23236, 728 N.W.2d 254, 261 (Minn. 2007) (per curiam) (concluding that lawyer who billed restricted lawyer’s time at contract attorney’s rate instead of paralegal’s rate violated Rule 1.5(a) of the Minnesota Rules of Professional Conduct);
  12. In re Petition for Disciplinary Action Against Padgett, 714 N.W.2d 706, 706 (Minn. 2006) (finding that lawyer who falsely billed time violated Rule 8.4(c) of the Minnesota Rules of Professional Conduct);
  13. Goeldner v. Miss. Bar, 891 So. 2d 130, 132-36 (Miss. 2004) (en banc) (suspending lawyer who billed law clerk’s services as though the lawyer had done the work himself, thus doubling his law clerk’s hourly rate);
  14. In re Engel, 169 P.3d 345, 349-50 (Mont. 2007) (finding that lawyer behaved unethically by charging client over $120,000 to handle a simple matter that should have cost $1,500-$2,500);
  15. In re Pape, 817 N.Y.S.2d 49, 51 (N.Y. App. Div. 2006) (per curiam) (disbarring lawyer who falsely billed expenses);
  16. In re Lowell, 784 N.Y.S.2d 69, 72, 76 (N.Y. App. Div. 2004) (per curiam) (disbarring lawyer who, among other violations, billed paralegal’s time at lawyer’s higher hourly rate);
  17. In re Entin, 732 N.Y.S.2d 648, 649 (N.Y. App. Div. 2001) (per curiam) (disbarring lawyer who repeatedly billed twenty-four to thirty-three hours per day);
  18. In re Robb, 731 N.Y.S.2d 437, 438, 440 (N.Y. App. Div. 2001) (per curiam) (disbarring lawyer who fraudulently billed client for some $2.5 million in fees and expenses);
  19. In re Duker, 662 N.Y.S.2d 847, 848 (N.Y. App. Div. 1997) (per curiam) (disbarring lawyer who pleaded guilty to mail fraud and other felonies related to fraudulent billing);
  20. Dayton Bar Ass’n v. Rogers, 876 N.E.2d 923, 926 (Ohio 2007) (per curiam) (suspending lawyer for fraudulent billing);
  21. Disciplinary Counsel v. Johnson, 865 N.E.2d 873, 886 (Ohio 2007) (per curiam) (suspending lawyer who billed for unnecessary work);
  22. Cincinnati Bar Ass’n v. Washington, 847 N.E.2d 435, 436-37 (Ohio 2006) (per curiam) (suspending lawyer for falsely billing insurance clients);
  23. Columbus Bar Ass’n v. Mills, 846 N.E.2d 1253, 1255-57 (Ohio 2006) (per curiam) ("[Mills] aggressively billed for secretarial, clerical, and other ‘administrative’ activities .... Respondent is therefore suspended from the practice of law in Ohio for one year.");
  24. Disciplinary Counsel v. Holland, 835 N.E.2d 361, 363-66 (Ohio 2005) (per curiam) (suspending lawyer, who was also charged with felony theft but acquitted, for fraudulent billing);
  25. Disciplinary Counsel v. Johnson, 835 N.E.2d 354, 358, 361 (Ohio 2005) (per curiam) (suspending associate, who was charged with felony theft but acquitted, for fraudulent billing);
  26. In re Conduct of Bennett, 14 P.3d 66, 68-69 (Or. 2000) (en banc) (per curiam) (suspending lawyer who charged clients for time spent in fee dispute with them);
  27. In re Martin, 374 S.C. 36, 37-39, 647 S.E.2d 218, 218-19 (2007) (per curiam) (suspending lawyer although finding that lawyer did not inflate his time as insurance executives instructed him to do);
  28. In re Lee, 370 S.C. 501, 502-03, 636 S.E.2d 624, 624-25 (2006) (per curiam) (suspending lawyer who billed insurance carrier for travel to out of town depositions that he attended by telephone from his office);
  29. In re Disciplinary Proceeding Against Vanderbeek, 101 P.3d 88, 105 (Wash. 2004) (en banc) (disbarring lawyer who padded bills);
  30. In re Disciplinary Proceedings Against Compton, 744 N.W.2d 78, 78-79 (Wis. 2008) (per curiam) (suspending lawyer who billed paralegal’s time as his own time);
  31. In re Disciplinary Proceedings Against Gernetzke, 725 N.W.2d 942, 943 (Wis. 2007) (per curiam) (suspending lawyer for falsely recording time);
  32. In re Disciplinary Proceedings Against Schuster, 741 N.W.2d 471, 472-73 (Wis. 2007) (per curiam) (suspending lawyer who overbilled client);
  33. In re Disciplinary Proceedings Against Winkel, 706 N.W.2d 661, 665 (Wis. 2005) (per curiam) (involving lawyer who wrote up associate’s time);
  34. In re Disciplinary Proceedings Against Davison, 640 N.W.2d 508, 509-10 (Wis. 2002) (per curiam) (suspending lawyer who fraudulently billed parking expenses);
  35. Bd. of Prof’l Responsibility, Wyo. State Bar v. Mulligan, 162 P.3d 468, 468, 471 (Wyo. 2007) (censuring lawyer who billed contract lawyer’s time as his own time).

Returning to the words of Lee A. Watson:

There seems to be a general consensus among Americans that all attorneys generally over bill their clients.  A multiplicity of jokes are told about attorneys every day .... the reality is that a significant number of attorneys are dishonest in the billing practices.  (Authorities, Watson, Pg. 1, Section II)

Again, the question is: Will the Bar turn a blind eye to billing fraud and fee gouging when it is committed by one of the largest and most powerful firms in the state?

Protection for Whistleblowing Attorneys

Professor Alex B. Long of the University of Tennessee Law School observes:

A profession that is truly serious about protecting those it serves from the harmful consequences of unethical conduct would adopt a system that would hold employers accountable when they have failed to adopt reasonable measures designed to prevent and detect potentially harmful conduct.  It would also promote the most efficient means of bringing misconduct to light and afford protection to those who do so. Currently, the legal profession does none of those things. (Authorities, Long (1), Pg. 790.)

Legislative Proposal.  Professor Long examines a number of approaches that would give necessary protection to attorneys who blow the whistle on unethical conduct.  He suggests that the Sarbanes-Oxley Act (which provides criminal penalties for anyone who retaliates against whistleblowers) be used as a model:

As is the case with the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, Title VII, and other statutes, the legal profession should prohibit retaliation not just against those who report misconduct externally to disciplinary authorities, but against those who, in good faith, act reasonably in raising concerns about misconduct within a law firm. (Authorities, Long (1), Pg. 816.)


The unifying theme in this analysis is the wrongful use of our system of justice.  We have been subjected to what can be accurately called legal terrorism, or “lawfare.”

Legal terrorism: The wrongful use of the courts and court processes to frighten or terrorize others into giving up their rights, their freedoms, or their property, often in furtherance of financial or political objectives; sometimes called “lawfare.”

Our story clearly shows the anti-democratic uses to which our court system has been put.  The issues we address are of supreme concern to the public perception of the Bar and due process.

[T]he profession is desperately concerned to mend its reputation...  (Authorities, Galanter, Pg. 195.)

Transparency is the keynote in restoring confidence.

“... justice should not only be done, but should manifestly and undoubtedly be seen to be done.” (R v Sussex Justices, ex parte McCarthy.)


  1. Amalfitano v. Rosenberg, July 15, 2008;
    Amalfitano v. Rosenberg, February 12, 2009;
    American Bar Association discussion, downloaded 5/2/14; New York Attorney Malpractice Blog discussion, dated 4/2/2014.
  2. American Legislative Exchange Council (“ALEC”), Honesty in Lawyering Act,
  3. Askew, Kim J., Chair, Section of Litigation, ABA.  “Alarms Still Sound to Preserve Attorney-Client Privilege,” published in Litigation Vol. 33, No. 2, Winter 2007.
  4. Arizona Bar, Concerns About Your Lawyer?
  5. Barton, Benjamin H. (1), University of Tennessee, Knoxville.  “The Lawyer-Judge Bias in the American Legal System,” Pgs. 1-2, Cambridge University Press, 2010.
  6. Barton, Benjamin H. (2), University of Tennessee, Knoxville.  “Do Judges Systematically Favor the Interests of the Legal Profession?” Pgs.1-2.  University of Tennessee College of Law Legal Studies Research Paper Series.  No 1.  Available: Social Science Research Network, The Wall Street Journal.
  7. Bucklo, Elaine B., U.S. District Court Northern District of Illinois.  “When Lawyers Lie.” published in Litigation, Vol. 33. No. 2, Winter 2007.
  8. Bulloch v. United States, 763 F.2d 1115, 1121 (10th Cir. 1985).
  9. DeBuse, James R.,  “Opening at $25 1/2 is Big Firm U.S.A.: Why America May Eventually Have a Publicly Traded Law Firm, and Why Law Firms Can Succeed Without Going Public,” Journal of Corporation Law.
  10. Fogarty, Paul of Dearman Fogarty, PLLC.  Letter to Lane Powell, PCC, September 22, 2011.
  11. Fortney, Susan Saab.  “Systematically Thinking About Law Firm Ethics: Conference on the Ethical Infrastructure and Culture of Law Firms,” Hofstra Law Review, 2013.
  12. Fox, Lawrence.  Visiting Lecturer at Yale Law School and partner of Drinker, Biddle & Readth LLP.  Former chairman of ABA Standing Committee on Ethics and Professional Responsibility and former chairman of ABA’s Section of Litigation.  “The Gang of Thirty-Three: Taking a Wrecking Ball to Client Loyalty,” March 27, 2012, The Yale Law Journal Online.
  13. Galanter, Marc and Palay, Thomas.  “Large Law Firms and Professional Responsibility,” Pgs. 189-195.  Published in R. Cranston (ed.), Legal Ethics and Professional Responsibility, Oxford University Press (1995) pp. 189-202.  (MarcGalanter.net.)  Marc Galanter is the John and Rylla Bosshard Professor of Law and South Asian Studies at the University of Wisconsin - Madison and LSE Centennial Professor at the London School of Economics and Political Science.  Thomas Palay is a former research fellow at the Brookings Institution, joined the UW Law School faculty in 1980.  He holds both a Ph.D. in Public Policy Analysis and a J.D. from the University of Pennsylvania.  He has taught a wide variety of courses since joining the faculty, including most recently Torts, Property, Business Organizations, Legislation, and Defamation & Rights of Privacy.  In June 2002, he completed a term of more than four years as Associate Dean for Academic Affairs.  Includes cited Atlanta Journal Constitution article of July 9, 1993, “Open season on lawyers.”
  14. Glass Decision, In re Stephen Randall Glass on Admission, Supreme Court of California, S196374, January 27, 2014.
  15. Green, Bruce A.,  Louis Stein Professor of Law and Director, Louis Stein Center for Law and Ethics, Fordham University School of Law.  “Foreword—The Legal Ethics Scholarship of Ted Schneyer: The Importance of Being Rigorous.”  Pgs. 365, 366.  Arizona Law Review, Volume 53:365. 2011.
  16. Harvard Law Review Association, “Collective sanctions and large law firm discipline.” Selected pages.  Harvard Law Review, May, 2005.
  17. Hazel-Atlas Glass Co. v. Hartford-Empire Co., 322 U.S. 238 (1944)
  18. H.K. Porter Co., Inc. v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 536 F.2d at 1115 (6th Cir.) .
  19. Jacobs, Dennis, “The Secret Life of Judges,” 75 Fordham Law Review, 2855 (2007).
  20. Justice at Stake/Brennan Center for Justice, Letter to Washington State Chief Justice Barbara Madsen, October 4, 2010.  (Cached
  21. Kim v. Westmoore Partners. 201 Cal.App.4th 267 (2011) 133 Cal. Rptr. 3d 774;
  22. Liptak, Adam.  “With the Bench Cozied Up to the Bar, the Lawyers Can’t Lose.” The New York Times, August 27, 2007.
  23. Long, Alex B. (1)  “Attorney Deceit Statutes: Promoting Professionalism Through Criminal Prosecutions and Treble Damages,” 44 UC Davis Law Review 413 (2010), University of Tennessee Legal Studies Research Paper No. 103.  Social Science Research Network,
  24. Long, Alex B. (2)  “Whistleblowing Attorneys and Ethical Infrastructures,” Maryland Law Review, January 2009, Volume 68 Issue 4.)
  25. McMorrow, Judith A.; Gardina, Jackie A.; Ricciardone, Salvatore.  “Judicial Attitudes Toward Confronting Attorney Misconduct: A View From the Reported Decisions.” Pgs. 1-4.  Hofstra Law Review, Summer, 2004.
  26. Melcher v. Greenberg Traurig, LLP, 2014 NY Slip Op 02213. Decided April 1, 2014.
  27. The Michigan Judicature, and miscellaneous practice acts, with revised court rules and forms of pleadings, Alva Marvin Cummins, Franklin A Beecher, George Mortimer Sayles, Leon Saunders, Harvey B M Wilds.
  28. Noyes, Henry S., “Federal Rule of Evidence 502: Stirring the State Law of Privilege and Professional Responsibility with a Federal Stick,” Washington and Lee Law Review, March 1, 2009.
  29. Oklahoma General Statutes, 1908. Chapter 7, Sec. 578. For what disbarred.
  30. Richmond, Douglas.  Senior Vice-President, Global Professional Practice.  “For A Few Dollars More: The Perplexing Problem of Unethical Billing Practices by Lawyers.” South Carolina Law Review, Vol. 60.  2008.
  31. Schneyer, Ted.  “Professional Discipline for Law Firms?”  77 Cornell Law Review, Rev. 1 (1991).
  32. South Dakota State Legislature.  16-19-34.  Deceit and collusion as grounds for disbarment--Treble damages.
  33. Stewart, James, Tangled Webs. How False Statements Are Undermining America.  Penguin, 2011, “Introduction.”
  34. Taylor, Stuart, “Sleazy in Seattle,” The American Lawyer, April 1, 1994.
  35. U.S. Legal Inc.: Criminal Conversion
  36. Watson, Lee A., J.D., Georgetown University Law Center.  “BILLING ISSUES: Communication, Honesty, and Contract: Three Buzzwords for Maintaining Ethical Hourly Billing.”  Georgetown Journal of Legal Ethics, Winter, 1998.
  37. Weaver, Justice Elizabeth A. and Schock, DavidJudicial Deceit, Peninsular Press, 2013.
  38. Wetlaufer, Gerald, Professor of Law, University of Iowa, “The Ethics of Lying in Negotiations.”  75 Iowa Law Review, 1219-74 (1990).
  39. Washington Bar Oath.
  40. Zitrin, Richard, and Langford, Carol, “The Moral Compass of the American Lawyer.”  Ballentine Books, 1999.


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